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Using dynamic programming, this paper examines effects of farm subsidies on U.S. 
exports of corn, cotton, rice, and wheat. The six policy simulations described here 
explore alternative proposals in the current round of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. The analysis leads to two conclusions. First, abolishing domestic subsidies 
lowers world prices of these crops. Second, imposing tighter supply controls may not 
actually decrease exports in the short run. 
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Diplomatic initiatives in the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) may require reform of both domestic 
and foreign farm subsidies. The international 
community has put forward several proposals, 
each offering a particular measure of industry 
protection.' Countries insist on simple protec- 
tion measures in order to negotiate multilateral 
reductions in domestic distortions, but such an 
ideal may be quixotic. We show below, for ex- 
ample, that policies attempting to tighten agri- 
cultural supply controls or reduce subsidies may 
not reduce output. Indeed, the effects of subsidy 
reforms depend upon farmers' expectations and 
the rent-seeking behavior of farms of different 
sizes and qualities. 
Policymakers faced an easier task in the Ken- 
nedy Round, where manufacturing was pro- 
tected predominantly by tariffs and other ad va- 
lorem distortions. In the current round, the GATT 
"framework agreement" of 1989 envisages us- 
ing an aggregate measure of support; signatories 
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' A good summary is given by the International Agricultural Re- 
search Trade Consortium (1990b). 
are to agree to a common percentage reduction 
in this measure.2 The most frequently cited pro- 
tection measure is the "Producer Subsidy Equiv- 
alent" (PSE), the per-unit transfer to farmers as 
a proportion of revenues. Because the PSE may 
not capture all distortionary effects of agricul- 
tural policy, the GATT (1989b) is also consid- 
ering effects of supply controls. 
We describe six hypothetical policy scenarios 
and use dynamic programming to show their ef- 
fects on markets for the major American export 
crops: corn, cotton, rice, and wheat. Each pol- 
icy represents elements of diplomatic initiatives 
considered in the GATT. The first policy rep- 
licates the status quo. The second policy elim- 
inates subsidies entirely; we find this typically 
lowers price and increases supply. The third 
policy freezes base acreages at 1987 levels, rais- 
ing price and decreasing supply. The fourth pol- 
icy halves the PSE for each crop by reducing 
target price and diversion payments and has lit- 
tle effect on markets. The fifth policy doubles 
payments for land left fallow, causing outputs 
of some crops actually to rise slightly. The sixth 
policy doubles acreage set-aside requirements, 
creating only modest output reductions. 
Literature Review 
Two different strands in the literature analyze 
the policy influences on exports of field crops 
2 See the GATT's Mid-Term Meeting, MTN.TNC/11, Geneva, 
21 April 1989a. The International Agricultural Trade Research 
Consortium (1990a) reviews many alternative measures. 
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from the United States. The first strand uses ad 
valorem measures to capture subsidies' general 
equilibrium effects (Hertel; Tyers and Ander- 
son; Trela, Whalley, and Wigle). For a survey 
of this literature, see Robinson. The second strand 
is devoted to individual commodity studies 
(Schmitz, Sigurdson, and Doering; McCalla and 
Josling) and follows the standard approach of 
Wallace, depicting acreage diversion as a left- 
ward shift in a crop's supply curve. Such an 
analysis is static and ignores many features of 
American farm policy. Gardner criticizes both 
strands of research for their lack of policy detail 
and for ignoring the Lucas critique. 
Although we use traditional techniques to de- 
scribe market demand, our model of market 
supply attempts to face Gardner's criticism. It 
incorporates many details of the political econ- 
omy of American agricultural subsidies. Unlike 
earlier approaches, it includes the relation be- 
tween subsidies and historical plantings, the re- 
quirement that farmers leave land fallow to re- 
ceive a subsidy, and the special payments farmers 
receive for acreage not planted. Our model em- 
phasizes that a farmer's participation is volun- 
tary. Using static price expectations, each farmer 
solves a stationary dynamic program depending 
explicitly on government policy. 
Our solution technique draws on Rust by us- 
ing a nested fixed-point algorithm to solve the 
farmer's dynamic program for each static price 
path. The algorithm searches for a price ap- 
proximating zero excess demand. 
The Model 
The present model extends the earlier one in de 
Gorter and Fisher by allowing for uncertainty, 
farm-specific costs, variable land qualities, and 
endogenous determination of world price. 
We begin by defining a vector of policy pa- 
rameters: 
(1) 0 = (T, y, 8, q, L), 
where r is the target price, y is the diversion 
payment in dollars per unit not planted, 8 is the 
diversion requirement, J is program yield, and 
L is loan rate in dollars. Parameter 8 E [0, 1) 
is the proportion of base acreage left fallow in 
order to qualify for subsidies. The target price 
is known at time of planting. The diversion pay- 
ment is paid for units not produced, an aspect 
of these programs often noted in the popular 
press. The farmer is paid subsidies based upon 
program yield.3 This yield is specific to each 
farmer, independent of vagaries of weather and 
land fertility, and known at time of planting. The 
loan rate is a price floor maintained by the fed- 
eral government. 
Let the farmer have base acreage x, and plant 
acreage u,. The farmer's costs per acre planted 
are 
(2) c(x,, ut) 
_ Fx, + vu, if u, ' x, 
Fu, + vu, + aF(u, - x)2 otherwise, 
where F is fixed cost, v is variable cost, and a 
is a quadratic adjustment parameter. Three com- 
ments are in order: first, farms with large base 
acreage have large fixed costs; second, farmers 
pay constant variable cost per planted acre; third, 
farmers pay a quadratic adjustment cost if they 
expand plantings beyond base acreage. The qua- 
dratic term captures the increasing opportunity 
cost of plantings beyond a historical norm. Since 
we use data on the full economic costs of plant- 
ing, parameter a is a penalty beyond the cost of 
acquiring and improving new land. The cost 
function depends explicitly upon base acreage in 
a natural way, with large farms having high fixed 
costs and low marginal costs. 
Let the world price of the crop be p. The farmer 
receives two kinds of subsidies: deficiency pay- 
ments and diversion payments. Deficiency pay- 
ments are 
sl(p, u,; 0) = (r - max {p, L})iu,, 
where the first term is the markup of target price 
above the maximum of loan rate and market 
price, and the second term shows subsidies are 
based upon program yield. Diversion payments 
are 
s2(x,, u,; 0) = y q max {0, (x, - u,)}, 
where y is payment for a unit not planted. These 
subsidies are also based upon program yields and 
can never be negative. A farmer receives a max- 
imum of $50,000 per year; hence total subsidies 
are 
s(p, x,, u,; 0) = min {s(') + s2(), 50000}. 
Subsidies depend upon market price, govern- 
ment policy, base acreage, and planted acreage. 
The farmer's decision is the solution to a sta- 
3 Program yields have been fixed since the middle part of the last 
decade, giving incentives for farmers with declining expected yields 
to participate. 
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tionary dynamic program. State variable x, is base 
acreage, and control u, is planted acres. At t, 
the time of planting, actual yield and price of 
output may be uncertain. Let ,/ be a random 
variable describing actual yield and let p be the 
analogous variable describing market price. Then 
a farmer in the subsidy program has expected 
revenues as follows: 
(3) g(x,, u,; 0) = E[s(p, x,, u,; 0) + pfiu,]. 
This expectation is based on the information 
available to the farmer at time of planting. 
American farmers receive both subsidies and 
revenues from sale of crops. Price expectations 
are static since they are independent of t. 
Now define the following: 
h(x,, u,; 0) g(x,, Ut; 0) - c(x,, u,), 
where h(x,, u,; 0) denotes the net expected rev- 
enues a participating farmer receives from plant- 
ing u, acres on base acreage x,. The farmer's re- 
ward is 
(4) r(x,, u,; 0) 
h(x,, u,; 0) if u, < (1 - 5)x, 
E[fifpu,t - c(x,, U,) otherwise, 
where the expectation is taken with respect to 
the farmer's information set at planting. Equa- 
tion (4) describes the program's voluntary as- 
pect: the farmer's discrete choice of whether to 
participate. If he participates, his expected prof- 
its are h(x,, u,; 0); otherwise, he receives ex- 
pected profits from selling his crop on the mar- 
ket. 
Current planting choice influences next year's 
base acreage in a deterministic way. In the United 
States, base acreage is currently defined as a five- 
year moving average of past plantings.4 Hence, 
.8 xt + . .2 + .u, 
Xt+1 = Xt 
.8 xt + .2 ut 
where x,+l is base acreage in period t + 1. Set 
Xt+ = z(x,, Ut) for future reference. This func- 
tion states that a farmer can expand base acreage 
by planting more than his current base. If a farmer 
fallows the required amount of acreage, his base 
acreage is left unchanged. Hence his "consid- 
ered plantings" are his full base. Finally, a farmer 
4See 7 U.S.C. 1464. Program yields used to be defined as a 
five-year moving average, but the low and high years were ex- 
cluded. 
(5) 
can decrease base acreage by idling more land 
than required. 
Let X be the state space and U be the control 
space. The solution to the farmer's dynamic 
program is characterized by 
(6) V(x,; 0) = max r(x,, u,; 0) + ftE[V(x,+ ; 0)], 
ute U 
where 8 is the discount factor and x,+1 is given 
by (5). A farmer with base acreage x, following 
an optimal planting scheme has V(x,; 0) as the 
present value of expected profits. 
The solution to (6) is the farmer's optimal 
planting decision: 
(7) U, = IT(x,; 0). 
A farmer's plantings depend upon base acreage, 
government policy, and expectations about all 
stochastic variables relevant to the planning 
problem. The analysis in de Gorter and Fisher 
describes several aspects of rr(x,; 0) in a simpler 
model. In that case, farmers with small base opt 
out, since historical plantings are insufficient to 
take full advantage of subsidies. Farmers with 
large base participate because it is not worth- 
while to increase base by sacrificing current 
subsidies. The behavior of farms with interme- 
diate base is indeterminate. These aspects of the 
farmer's planting program are inherent in the 
comparative dynamics below. 
To complete the description of market supply, 
we need to determine the aggregate effect of the 
farmers' decisions. Let the number of farmers 
be N and the observed density of base acreages 
be f(x,).5 Then the aggregate output of the crop 
is 
if u, < (1 - S)x, 
if (1 - 8)x, , t u x, 
if x, < u,, 
(8) S(O) = N [E]Tr(x,; 0)f(x,) dx,. 
o xtEX 
Market supply depends upon government pol- 
5 A referee pointed out astutely that we are limiting the analysis 
by taking N and f(x,) as fixed. The ergodic distribution of base 
acreage is endogenous, and it depends upon long-run forecasts of 
government policy and a fully explicit formulation of the price path 
induced by a new policy. 
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icy, the expectations of each farmer, average 
yield, and the distribution of farm base acreages. 
The market's demand side consists of three 
elements: domestic demand, foreign demand, and 
accumulation of stocks. Domestic demand is 
given by the simple function Dh(p) = Apf, where 
A and e are parameters to be determined from 
data on domestic consumption. Likewise, for- 
eign demand is given by Df(p) = A*p , where 
A* and E* are determined from data on exports. 
We model the accumulation (or decumulation) 
of inventories as an exogenous flow; let us de- 
note this by AI.6 Then world demand for crops 
produced in the United States is 
(9) D(p) = Dh(p) + Df(p) + Al, 
where all functions and variables are as above. 
This enables us to define a partial equilibrium 
for government policy 0 as a price p such that 
(10) Z(p; 0) = D(p) - S(O) = 0. 
Since there is no analytical solution, it is nec- 
essary to use numerical methods to simulate these 
equilibria. 
Data and Simulation Method 
Table 1 presents policy parameters for corn, 
cotton, rice, and wheat in 1987. Complete data 
on distributions of base acreage for these crops 
in 1987 were obtained from the U.S. Depart- 
ment of Agriculture's Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service. The data describe only 
the state and county of farms having base; they 
6 This is the accumulation of inventories by both private agents 
and the public sector. Although (9) is a description of market de- 
mand, the accumulation of inventories is used to maintain the loan 
rate in the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program. Farmers' expectations 
about these stocks are captured in expected reward function (4). 
do not indicate farmers' participation decisions. 
Base acreages follow classical exponential dis- 
tributions. 
Although our model uses continuous state and 
control spaces, it is necessary to make these 
spaces discrete in practical applications. We di- 
vided the state space into forty intervals: 
I 
= {[0, 4], [5, 9], ..., [200, oo)}. 
Although the last category contains farms of 
widely different sizes, the percentages of farms 
in this class were only 3.5% for corn, 6.0% for 
cotton, 20.8% for rice, and 6.5% for wheat. Since 
these farms produce a disproportionate share of 
output, we pay special attention to them in de- 
scribing the different policies below. Finally, the 
choice of forty dimensions was dictated by com- 
putational considerations. 
The number of farms and total base acreage 
are available for each category. We defined the 
state space X = {x, ..., x40} as the within-group 
average acreage. Note that X depends upon the 
distribution of farms for the crop in question. 
We set the control space U = X. Because these 
are discrete approximations, transition rule (5) 
is no longer entirely accurate. Define x41 oo 
and let x, E X and u, E U, where both sets are 
now discrete. Then the transition is z : X x U 
-> X whose rule is 
(1 1) Z(Xt, u,) = xi ->z(x, ut) E [Xi, Xi+1), 
where xi is the ith element of X. It is difficult 
for a farmer to build up base because he must 
plant enough acreage to attain the average, not 
minimal, farm size in any category. 
Since we did not have data on yields for each 
farm, we modeled the heterogeneity of farm 
qualities by assuming that yields follow inde- 
pendent symmetric binomial distributions across 
base acreage categories. Mean yields for corn, 
cotton, rice, and wheat were set at actual his- 
torical yields from national data in 1987, and 
Table 1. Market Prices and Policy Parameters in 1987 
Market Target Loan Diversion Diversion Program 
Price Price Rate Factor Payments Yield 
(p) ( (L) (L) (y)) (O) 
Corn $1.94 $3.03 $1.82 0.314 $0.59 104.0 
Cotton $0.64 $0.79 $0.52 0.286 $0.00 593.0 
Rice $7.27 $11.66 $6.84 0.392 $0.00 46.8 
Wheat $2.57 $4.38 $2.28 0.312 $0.00 35.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Historical Commodity Data Series: 1950-1987. 
Notes: Prices are dollars per bushel, pound, or cwt., as relevant. Diversion payments are in dollars per bushel, pound, or cwt. not planted. 
Program yields are in bushels, pounds, or cwt. per acre, as relevant. 
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standard deviations were calculated from yields 
for 1980 through 1987.7 
The cost function (2) was calibrated using fixed 
and variable costs per acre in McElroy, Ali, 
Dismukes, and Clauson. The quadratic adjust- 
ment parameter a was the only variable used to 
fit actual data in 1987. We assumed a was the 
same for both yields and searched for a value 
predicting within 1% of historical output. Ad- 
justment parameters were calibrated at 1.5 x 
10-2, 1.0 x 10, 1.0 10-', and 5.9 x 10-4 
for corn, cotton, rice, and wheat respectively. 
The interpretation of these values is that farmers 
must pay the full economic cost of planting and 
a further penalty to plant more than base acreage. 
For example, planting ten acres beyond base costs 
a corn farmer $2467; the analogous costs for 
cotton, rice, and wheat are $8591, $8198, and 
$1161 respectively. The low value for wheat re- 
flects the ease of bringing marginal land into 
7 The mean yields in 1987 for corn, cotton, rice, and wheat were 
119.8, 702, 55.55, and 39.8 respectively. Their respective standard 
deviations were 13.2, 83.2, 4.6, and 2.1. Table 1 gives the units 
and source for these data. 
cultivation, and the high value for rice indicates 
how difficult it is to assure plentiful supplies of 
water on new land. Although the quadratic pen- 
alty is paid only in the first year, farmers pay 
higher fixed costs in every subsequent year to 
maintain the expanded base. Still, some pro- 
grams are so lucrative that farmers plant beyond 
base in anticipation of higher future subsidies. 
Figure 1 presents results of the calibration for 
a low-yield corn farm; other crops and farm yields 
are similar. Units on the two horizontal axes are 
acres; those on the vertical axis are expected 
present-value dollars. To keep the scales man- 
ageable, the surface has been truncated at 
-$10,000. State space X is graphed on the right 
axis; control space U is graphed on the left axis. 
The height of the surface reflects the present value 
of having base acreage x,, planting ut, and then 
subsequently following an optimal program. An 
optimal planting decision achieves the highest 
dollar value for each base acreage; thus, 7r(x,; 
0) is the projection of the surface's highest points 
onto the horizontal plane. The kink occurs when 
a farmer opts out of a program and the surface 
slopes down for u, > x,, because of the quadratic 
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penalty. The surface slopes up along the X axis, 
because larger base entails higher profits. 
Data in table 2 were used to calibrate the 
model's demand side. The demand elasticities 
allow for different domestic and foreign price 
responsiveness; they are derived from Roningen 
and Dixit. Domestic demand is typically less 
elastic than international demand. The differ- 
ence between domestic production and total 
consumption established the value of the stock 
accumulation in (9). 
Using a nested fixed-point algorithm, we sim- 
ulated the solution to equation (10) to determine 
partial equilibrium for each crop. For each p, 
the inner part solved for the optimal policy Ir(x,; 
0).8 We actually solved two dynamic programs 
at each step: one for a low-yield farm and an- 
other for a high-yield farm. Then supply in (8) 
was calculated using the distributions of farm 
sizes and farm yields. The outer part of the al- 
gorithm checked the sign of excess demand. Then 
price was raised or lowered by $.01, and the 
inner algorithm was run again. Price p is an 
8 Setting P = 1.05 ' for all simulations, we achieve convergence 
in the supremum norm on the order of 10-7, corresponding to $.01 
for $100,000 in present-value profits for the farmer. 
equilibrium if excess demand changes sign dur- 
ing the current iteration.9 
Empirical Findings 
Using the calibrated supplies, we solved first for 
equilibrium under the current American policy. 
Then we analyzed the five other policies de- 
scribed above. Tables 3, 4, and 5 abbreviate these 
six policies with subscripts. The status quo sets 
01 = (r, y, 6, q, L), where values of these pa- 
rameters are given in table 1. The second pol- 
icy, which eliminates all subsidies, sets 02 = (0, 
0, 0, 0, 0) and constrains the transition function 
to be z(xt, ut) = xt. This shows what market con- 
ditions would be if subsidies were abolished and 
operators of large farms had permanently high 
fixed costs. The third policy, which freezes base 
acreage, corresponds to 03 = 01 and transition 
rule z(x,, ut) = x,. Since fixed costs are part of 
9 The equilibrium may not be unique, and approximation to it 
can be wrong by as much as $.02. Using the Gauss Programming 
Language, each simulation took approximately two minutes to con- 
verge on a personal computer with an 80286 chip and a math co- 
processor. 
Table 2. Data Used in Simulating the Demand Functions 
(Billions of Units, Except for the Demand Elasticities) 
Domestic Domestic 
Consumption Exports Production e E* 
Corn 6.041 1.716 8.877 -0.21 -1.176 
Cotton 3.631 3.045 6.948 -0.20 -2.060 
Rice 0.074 0.072 0.130 -0.25 -10.000 
Wheat 1.086 1.598 2.108 -0.35 -2.696 
Sources: The data for domestic consumption, net exports, and domestic production are given in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Historical 
Commodity Data Series: 1950-1987. Each demand elasticity is calculated as an arc elasticity from the simulations reported in Roningen 
and Dixit. 
Table 3. Is Farming Profitable Under These Policies? 
01 02 03 04 05 06 
Corn, low Y N Y N Y N 
Corn, high Y Y Y Y Y 
Cotton, low N N N N N N 
Cotton, high Y N Y Y Y Y 
Rice, low Y N Y N Y N 
Rice, high Y N Y Y Y Y 
Wheat, low Y N Y N Y N 
Wheat, high Y N Y N Y N 
Note: 01 is the simulated base case, 02 abolishes the subsidies, 03 freezes base acreage, 04 halves Producer Subsidy Equivalent, 85 increases 
diversion payments, and 06 doubles the diversion requirement. 
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Table 4. The Effects of the Six Different Policies 
Price Supply Exports Subsidies 
(dollars) (billions of units) (billions of units) (billions of dollars) 
Corn, 1987 data 1.94 8.9 1.7 7.4 
Corn, 01 1.92 8.7 1.5 5.4 
Corn, 02 2.00 8.9 1.8 0.0 
Corn, 03 2.36 8.5 1.6 2.4 
Corn, 04 2.00 10.1 3.0 1.5 
Corn, 05 1.84 7.1 -0.1 6.9 
Corn, 06 2.00 9.1 1.9 2.6 
Cotton, 1987 data 0.64 6.9 3.0 1.0 
Cotton, 01 0.62 7.0 3.1 0.4 
Cotton, 02 0.52 8.7 4.6 0.0 
Cotton, 03 0.58 7.4 3.5 0.4 
Cotton, 04 0.62 7.0 3.0 0.2 
Cotton, 05 0.62 7.0 3.1 0.6 
Cotton, 06 0.66 7.0 3.1 0.1 
Rice, 1987 data 7.27 0.13 0.07 0.5 
Rice, 0, 7.23 0.13 0.08 0.2 
Rice, 02 6.83 0.19 0.13 0.0 
Rice, 03 7.25 0.13 0.07 0.2 
Rice, 04 7.13 0.14 0.09 0.1 
Rice, 05 7.31 0.13 0.07 0.3 
Rice, 06 7.25 0.13 0.07 0.1 
Wheat, 1987 data 2.57 2.1 1.6 3.3 
Wheat, 0, 2.55 1.9 1.4 2.3 
Wheat, 02 2.25 2.8 2.3 0.0 
Wheat, 03 2.63 2.4 1.9 1.2 
Wheat, 04 2.83 2.1 1.7 0.5 
Wheat, 05 2.21 2.4 1.9 3.8 
Wheat, 06 2.85 2.0 1.6 0.6 
Note: The 1987 data are from the USDA's Historical Commodity Data Series: 1950-1987, and the other policies are as in table 3. 
Table 5. The Supply Shares of Large Farms 
01 02 03 04 05 06 
Corn 17 29 24 21 20 20 
Cotton 52 54 63 52 52 48 
Rice 72 69 74 67 73 65 
Wheat 36 56 65 53 28 54 
Note: A large farm is one with at least two hundred base acres, 
and all numbers are percentages. 01 is the simulated base case, 02 
abolishes the subsidies, 03 freezes base acreage, 04 halves Producer 
Subsidy Equivalent, 05 increases diversion payments, and 06 dou- 
bles the diversion requirement. 
cost function (2), this imposes a permanent pen- 
alty on large farms not covering average costs. 
The fourth policy, which halves PSE, is 04 = 
(r', y/2, 6, ti, L), where r' = (r + p)/2 and p 
is price from the simulated base case. The fifth 
policy is given by 05 = (r, y', 5, ?, L), where 
Y' = y + (r - p)/2 and p is again the price 
from the simulated base case. This scenario in- 
creases diversion payments by half the ad va- 
lorem subsidy to farmers. The sixth case sets 06 
= (, y, 28, ?, L), doubling the proportion of 
land that farmers must leave fallow to qualify 
for subsidies. 
To understand these policies fully, it would 
be necessary to graph all forty-eight value func- 
tions. Table 3 provides instead a summary of 
the policies' effects. Since (2) was calibrated 
using the full economic cost of planting, value 
functions are farmers' pure economic rent. Hence 
these functions are the incremental value accru- 
ing to a landowner who has maintained base 
acreage by following an optimal planting pro- 
gram. For example, using the functions for corn, 
we calculated that the purchase of a low-yield 
corn farm with 340 acres base includes a pre- 
mium of about $145 per acre above the price of 
such land without base. A high-yield corn farm 
commands an analogous premium of $405 per 
acre. Table 3 indicates, for each policy and each 
farm type, whether these premiums are positive. 
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A "Y" indicates a profitable program; an "N" 
shows an unprofitable one. 
We draw two conclusions from table 3. First, 
farming in America would be unprofitable with- 
out subsidies. This finding corroborates the gen- 
eral conclusions about (negative) residual re- 
turs to management and risk, net of government 
payments, reported in McElroy, Ali, Dismukes, 
and Clauson. Second, most policies reducing 
subsidies make low-yield farms unprofitable. 
Lowering Producer Subsidy Equivalent makes 
the premiums on low-yield land negative for each 
of the four crops. 
Figure 2 shows the value surface for a low- 
yield corn farm when subsidies are abolished. 
Contrasting this figure with figure 1 shows how 
government policy changes the nature of the op- 
timal planting program. Units on the vertical axis 
are now hundreds of thousands of dollars of ex- 
pected present-value losses, and the surface is 
truncated at -$100,000. The axes are the same 
as in figure 1, but now the surface slopes down 
along the X axis because large low-yield corn 
farms are not remunerative. Farms with more 
than 160 acres of base are quite unprofitable be- 
cause of their high sunk costs. The optimal 
planting program is simply to plant to capacity, 
minimizing expected losses. 
Table 4 presents the entire array of simulation 
results. It concentrates on price, domestic sup- 
ply, exports, and total subsidies. These policy 
simulations are valid, of course, only for the ob- 
served distributions of base acreage and postu- 
lated distribution of farm yields in 1987; since 
these distributions change only slowly, the sim- 
ulations are germane for the first half of this de- 
cade.'0 These summary effects do not take ac- 
count of subsidy program participation rates, nor 
do they show the differential effects policies have 
on low-yield and high-yield farms or on small 
and large farms. We discuss these effects be- 
low. 
Calibrations of the partial equilibria are all very 
good. For all four crops, the model matches the 
historical data for price, domestic supply, and 
exports. Because the model predicts low partic- 
10 There has been an upward trend in yields for these crops. Since 
program yields have been fixed for several years, farmers adopting 
efficient technologies will find participation less remunerative as 
time goes by. Therefore, our predictions about output and exports 
may be slightly conservative. 
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ipation rates, it does not match subsidies very 
well, consistently predicting lower deficiency 
payments than actually occurred. Predicted par- 
ticipation rates for the calibrated equilibria were 
56% for corn, 78% for cotton, 75% for rice, and 
97% for wheat. The historical rates in 1987 were 
91% for corn, 93% for cotton, 96% for rice, and 
88% for wheat. When the model predicts a de- 
cision not to participate, it is almost always that 
of a high-yield farmer opting out. 
Three general conclusions can be drawn from 
table 4. First, subsidy programs restrict output 
and raise the profitability of farming.1 This is 
clearly true for cotton, rice, and wheat, as is 
shown by comparing the predictions under 02 with 
those under 01. Second, policies designed to re- 
strict farm output, such as increased diversion 
payments and increased diversion requirements, 
do not restrict production in the short run. Third, 
none of the policies has a radical effect on prices. 
This follows from the specification of costs of 
planting and high price elasticity of demand for 
American exports. 
Freezing base acreage (03) tends to raise prices 
and has equivocal effects on participation de- 
cisions. Since it is no longer possible to build 
up base, it is not worthwhile to opt out of the 
program for a year or two. Hence participation 
rates increase. But the lower aggregate output 
raises the world price of the crop. There is an 
off-setting tendency for large fertile farms to opt 
out of programs because the implicit subsidies 
inherent in deficiency payments are no longer 
as attractive. 
Reducing producer subsidy equivalent (04) has 
mixed effects. This policy has little impact on 
markets for cotton or rice, but it does change 
production decisions of corn and wheat farmers, 
lowering participation rates. This effect occurs 
for three reasons. First, subsidies are no longer 
as attractive to farmers with high yields, and some 
large farms divert fewer acres. Second, since 
these two crops have low penalties for expand- 
ing base acreage, several categories of corn farms 
with intermediate base acreage now find it 
worthwhile to build up base. Third, the pro- 
grams are no longer profitable for wheat farm- 
ers, and large high-yield wheat farms minimize 
losses by opting out of the program. Of course, 
this policy uniformly reduces subsidies the 
American taxpayer must finance. 
" This result follows from the specification of cost function (2). 
In de Gorter and Fisher, we reached a different conclusion using a 
cost function that did not penalize farmers for expanding base acreage. 
Our results indicate that the GATT's empha- 
sis on supply controls may be misguided for the 
United States. The two policies designed to ex- 
plore this were 05, increasing diversion pay- 
ments, and 06, doubling the diversion require- 
ment. Consider the effects of 05. Cotton, rice, 
and wheat farmers, who received no diversion 
payments in 1987, now find these programs more 
remunerative. Farmers with large base acreages 
might continue to participate, but farmers with 
small base and good land will tend to opt out in 
order to build up base. The net effect is not nec- 
essarily to decrease output. 
Now consider 06. Increasing the amount of land 
a farmer must leave fallow makes these pro- 
grams less remunerative for high-yield farms with 
high base acreage. They may opt out of the pro- 
grams. Indeed, participation rates for all four 
crops fall in the simulations of this policy sce- 
nario. In practice, neither of these policies seems 
to decrease exports or domestic production sig- 
nificantly. 
The largest category of corn, cotton, rice, and 
wheat farms average 342, 402, 463, and 440 
base acres respectively. Table 5 shows how the 
different policies affect these farms. Abolishing 
subsidies increases the shares of large corn farms 
since farmers plant up to capacity, taking ad- 
vantage of sunk costs. Programs reducing the 
profitability of wheat farming (02, 03, 04, and 06) 
have analogous effects. Finally, for all crops and 
policies, farms in the largest and penultimate 
categories undertake similar planting decisions, 
indicating that a finer sample of large farms would 
not change our results. 
Conclusion 
This paper applies dynamic programming to the 
political economy of American agricultural sub- 
sidies. Our model emphasizes that a farmer's 
expectations about farm yield and government 
policy influence the decision to seek subsidies. 
The model was calibrated using an adjustment 
cost penalizing farms for expanding plantings. 
We explored alternative policies, some of which 
may be outcomes of the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT. 
The main policy conclusion is that abolishing 
the programs will increase exports and lower 
world prices of these crops. However, if we had 
used a cost function allowing farms to expand 
base easily, we would have found quite differ- 
ent results. A second important conclusion is that 
tightening supply controls may not decrease out- 
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put. Indeed, a policy's effect depends upon cur- 
rent distributions of base acreage and land fer- 
tilities. If farmers perceive a policy reform is 
permanent, there may be an increase in current 
output in order to increase future subsidies. That 
some farms do build up base in anticipation of 
higher subsidies in an important consequence of 
these programs. 
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